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A CONSTITUTIONAL RECLASSIFICATION OF
"EXPRESS ADVOCACY"
Advertisements about public officials and public policy are an
important form of political speech for people to express their
views and to influence others. Political advertisements have a long
history in the United States. In 1936, commercials ran criticizing
President Franklin Roosevelt's proposal to create a Social Security
system.' Traditionally, speakers have complete First Amendment
protection when discussing public issues.2
In 1976, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in
Buckley v. Valeo,3 in which the Court clarified several constitu-
tional issues regarding the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
("FECA").4 The Court ruled that Congress could not, consistently
with the First Amendment, regulate advertisements that discuss
public issues.5 However, Congress could constitutionally subject
advertisements that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
candidate, known as independent expenditures, to disclosure re-
quirements because of the public's right to election information.6
Since 1996, individuals, interest groups, and political parties
have spent millions of dollars to air so-called "issue" ads that criti-
cize candidates by name.7 The candidates themselves criticize the
content of these advertisements because they are often personal
I DARRELL M. WEST & BURDETT A. LooMis, THE SOUND OF MONEY 51 (1999).
2 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) ("The First Amendment af-
fords the broadest protection to... political expression.").
3 Id.
4 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2003).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43-44.
6 See id. at 81-82.
7 See DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY 53 (2000).
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attacks rather than a substantive discussion of political issues. 8 A
more important concern may be that many of these ads run by
anonymous interest groups and political parties are subject to no
disclosure requirements because they intentionally and carefully
avoid using words that expressly advocate the candidate's election
or defeat. As a result, the public is robbed of vital election infor-
mation.
On March 27, 2002, the 107th Congress passed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") to combat these con-
cerns.9 On the same day, President George W. Bush signed it into
law despite his misgivings.1° This legislation consists of compre-
hensive amendments to the FECA. Title II of the BCRA classifies
election advertisements that occur immediately before an election
as "electioneering communications" and subjects them to the same
disclosure requirements as independent expenditures." Title II
also places restrictions on corporations and labor unions that air
electioneering communications.
2
Many members of Congress vigorously opposed the legisla-
tion, and it has been challenged in court on many fronts.' 3 On May
21, 2003, a three-judge panel of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia issued its lengthy decision in McCon-
nell v. Federal Election Commission,14 upholding and invalidating
various portions of the new law. Pursuant to a provision in the
BCRA, the decision will be directly appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. '5  The Supreme Court significantly changed its
usual schedule by agreeing to hear oral arguments on September 8,
2003, four weeks before the beginning of its new term. 16
In Buckley, the Supreme Court created the "express advocacy"
standard to narrow the reach of the FECA. In the BCRA, Con-
8 George F. Will, The First Amendment on Trial, WASH. POST, Dec. I, 2002, at B7.
9 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81
(2002).
10 See Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 WKLY.
COMP. PRES. DOc. 517, 518 (Mar. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Statement] (noting that "the bill does
have flaws" and questioning "the constitutionality of the broad ban on issue advertising").
I See § 201 (a), 116 Stat. at 88-89.
12 § 203, 116 Stat. at 91-92.
13 See Mark Hansen, Costly Speech: Failure to Follow Legal Requirements for Political
Contributions Can Mean Serious Trouble, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 36, 42. Senator Mitch
McConnell (R-KY), one of the BCRA's most outspoken critics, filed one of the first lawsuits
that were consolidated as McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-582 (D.D.C. 2002).
14 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam).
15 See § 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. at 114.
16 Charles Lane, Court to Hear Campaign Finance Arguments Sept. 8; Justices Alter




gress reclassifies this standard by distinguishing a new form of
speech called "electioneering communication." This Note dis-
cusses whether Congress can constitutionally do so. My conclu-
sion is that it can.
Part I briefly outlines the relevant provisions of the BCRA.
Part II discusses the Supreme Court's creation and reaffirmation of
the express advocacy standard and outlines the different categories
of communication that resulted from the Court's line drawing.
Part III outlines the Federal Election Commission's ("FEC") un-
successful litigation strategy aimed at broadening the express ad-
vocacy standard. Part IV discusses modern issue advertisements
from recent elections, outlines the harms these advertisements are
thought to cause, and analyzes the justifications for regulation.
Part V outlines in greater detail the relevant portions of the BCRA
and Congress' reasons for enacting it.
Part VI discusses whether the express advocacy standard from
Buckley is constitutionally required under the First Amendment. I
will argue that the express advocacy standard is not a constitu-
tional requirement for two reasons. First, Congress amended the
FECA in 1974 to address different concerns of campaign financ-
ing. As a result, the Court in Buckley created the express advocacy
standard as a form of statutory construction to save a poorly drawn
statute. Second, the federal court decisions upholding the express
advocacy standard were merely constrained by the Court's statu-
tory interpretation of the FECA.
Part VII analyzes the two definitions of "electioneering com-
munication" under the First Amendment principles outlined in
Buckley. Two judges in McConnell held that the primary defini-
tion of electioneering communication was unconstitutional. 7 Two
judges held that the second definition was constitutional by sever-
ing its final clause. However, the Supreme Court should reverse
both of these holdings. First, the primary definition of electioneer-
ing communication is consistent with First Amendment principles
because it is a bright-line rule that is narrowly drawn to cover only
one form of election advertisements. Second, the alternative defi-
nition of electioneering communication is unconstitutionally
vague.
17 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
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I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT OF 2002
The BCRA distinguishes a new form of campaign advertising
called electioneering communications and provides two alternate
definitions. Under the first definition, an ad becomes an election-
eering communication if it (1) airs 60 days before a general elec-
tion or 30 days before a primary, runoff, or caucus, (2) refers to a
specific federal candidate, and (3) is targeted to the relevant elec-
torate. Under the alternative definition, the ad becomes an elec-
tioneering communication if it attacks, opposes, supports, or pro-
motes a federal candidate and it has no other plausible meaning.
However, news stories and editorials are exempt from the defini-
tion. 8
Electioneering communications are subject to disclosure re-
quirements like independent expenditures. More specifically, in-
dividuals and groups producing independent expenditures must
disclose the amount of money and to whom the expenditures per-
tain.' 9 However, corporations and labor unions are banned from
using funds from their general treasuries to produce and air elec-
tioneering communications.2 0 Groups that qualify as tax-exempt
and charitable organizations are exempt from the BCRA's cover-
age.2'
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE "ExPRESS ADVOCACY" STANDARD
A. Campaign Finance Legislation
In 1971, Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign
Act. This legislation consisted of modest reforms, such as requir-
ing candidates to fully disclose contributions and expenditures and
placing limits on advertising expenditures. The successes of the
new law were outweighed by the damage of the Watergate scan-
dals of 1972, which illustrated illegal activities related to President
Richard Nixon's campaign contributions. As a result, Congress
passed the 1974 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign
Act to implement further reform. These new regulations placed
limits on contributions to candidates, placed limits on candidate
and individual campaign expenditures, implemented disclosure
requirements, provided for public funding of presidential elections,
18 § 201, 116 Stat. at 89-90.
19 § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88.
20 § 203, 116 Stat. at91.
21 § 203, 116 Stat. at 91-92.
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and created the Federal Election Commission to enforce and ad-
minister election laws.
22
B. The Supreme Court's Express Advocacy Standard
1. Buckley v. Valeo
In Buckley v. Valeo,23 the Supreme Court determined the con-
stitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act. As a general
principle, the Court stated that contribution and expenditure limita-
tions strongly implicate the First Amendment because elections are
fundamental First Amendment activities.24  According to the
Court, a major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the
discussion of governmental affairs and candidates for election.2
Widespread debate allows people to make informed choices to
effect desired political and social change. Therefore, the First
Amendment provides broad protection to political expression.26
In a portion of the opinion, the Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of independent expenditure limitations. The statute pro-
hibited all individuals and groups who made "any expenditure...
relative to a clearly identified candidate" from spending more than
$1,000 on expenditures during a calendar year.27 The Court stated
that because First Amendment concerns are so important, the pro-
visions regulating speech must be extremely precise to provide fair
warning to speakers and to avoid a chilling effect on speech. 28 The
Court determined that the definition of independent expenditures
was unconstitutionally vague because the phrase "relative to" did
not clearly indicate permissible and impermissible speech. 29 To
cure the vagueness problem in this provision, the Court ruled that
the phrase "relative to" must be construed to mean "advocating the
30election or defeat" of a candidate.
The Court's reconstruction of the statute's language, however,
did not cure its unconstitutional vagueness. The Court noted that
in application, the newly construed statute would erase the distinc-
22 CONG. QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCES: HISTORY, FACTS,
AND CONTROVERSY 39, 41 (1992); ROBERT K. GOIDEL ET AL., MONEY MATTERS 2, 26-27
(1999).
23 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
24 Id. at 14.
25 Id. (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 39.
28 Id. at 41 n.48 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
29 Id. at 41.
30 Id. at 42.
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tion between issue discussion and advocacy of a candidate's elec-
tion or defeat.3' With this finding, the Court created the express
advocacy standard. The Court recognized that candidates and
campaigns were public issues. Yet, an audience's understanding
of a speaker's intentions can differ widely. The Court, therefore,
wanted to avoid distinguishing between advocacy and discussion
based on the audience's understanding of the speaker's intentions.
Otherwise, the statute provided no fair warning to speakers as to
whether their speech was covered. As a result, speakers would
chill their speech.32 Therefore, the Court held that to be an inde-
pendent expenditure, a communication must use "explicit words"
of advocacy or defeat.33 In a famous footnote, the Court offered
the following examples of express advocacy of election or defeat:
"vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for
Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject. 34
2. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc.
The Supreme Court has applied the express advocacy standard
in only one case. In Federal Election Commission v. Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life, Inc. ("MCFL"),35 a nonprofit corporation
published and distributed a newsletter prior to a primary election.36
The corporation paid for the newsletter with funds from its general
treasury. The front page of the newsletter contained the headline
"EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PRO-LIFE"
and warned the audience "[n]o pro-life candidate can win in No-
vember without your vote in September. 37 The newsletter pro-
vided the photographs of only those candidates whose voting re-
cords or stated positions were favored by the organization. A
complaint was filed with the FEC alleging that MCFL violated the
FECA by paying for independent expenditures with its general
corporate treasury funds.38
The Court determined that MCFL's activities fell within the
scope of the statute. 39 However, the Court reaffirmed that a com-
3' Id.
32 Id. at 43 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
33 Id.
4 Id. at 44 n.52.
35 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
36 Id. at 241-43.
317 Id. at 243.
38 Id. at 241, 244; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2000), amended by 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)
(2002).
39 Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 248.
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munication's language must meet Buckley's express advocacy
standard in order to qualify as an independent expenditure under
the FECA. The Court recognized that the language in the newslet-
ter was not as specific as the "vote for Smith" example used in
Buckley. The newsletter, however, urged voters to vote for pro-life
candidates and provided photographs of such candidates. Instead
of a discussion of public issues, the newsletter contained an ex-
plicit directive: "Vote for these candidates"; thus, the newsletter
constituted "express advocacy." 4
C. Types of Communication after Buckley
1. Independent Expenditures
Independent expenditures are the first form of speech that
Buckley's distinction creates. These communications occur when
an individual, without coordination with the candidate, spends
money on an ad that expressly advocates a candidate's election or
defeat.41 The Court in Buckley ruled that individual expenditures
could be constitutionally subjected to disclosure requirements, but
could not be constitutionally limited in amount.42
2. "Educational" Issue Advertisements
All other forms of election communication that do not ex-
pressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate fall under the
category of issue advocacy. However, this broad term can be fur-
ther subdivided into separate subcategories. The first form of issue
advocacy is called "educational" issue advocacy. In these in-
stances, groups run ad campaigns to educate the public rather than
to influence an election. For example, some groups air advertise-
ments that encourage people to vote. Other educational ads publi-
cize the voting records of elected officials to inform the public
about their representatives.43 These ads are not subject to any form
of regulation and probably cannot be regulated consistently with
the First Amendment. Congress has not advocated regulating
these and purposefully hopes to protect them under the BCRA.
44
40 Id. at 249-50. The Court, however, found that the provision violated the First Amend-
ment as applied to MCFL. Id. at 263.
41 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
42 Id. at 52, 84.
4- WEST & LOOMIS, supra note I, at 64; David B. Magleby, Interest-Group Election Ads,
in OUTSIDE MONEY: SoFr MONEY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS 41, 57 (David B. Magleby ed., 2000).
44 See John McCain & Russell Feingold, S. 25: Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, in
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3. "Legislative" Issue Advertisements
Another form of issue advocacy is called "legislative" issue
advocacy, in which groups run advertisements advocating their
position on pending legislation.45 The immediate goal of this type
of advertisement is not to influence an election, although legisla-
tive ads often urge the audience to contact their representatives.
For example, in 1993 an interest group called the Health Insurance
Association of America ran ads depicting a couple named "Harry
and Louise" criticizing President Clinton's health care bill. These
ads were run in congressional districts represented by committee
members in charge of health care legislation. The tobacco compa-
nies used a similar approach by frequently running ads in many
markets criticizing tobacco-free initiatives as a tax increase. Both
of these ads were widely seen as extremely successful in framing
the political debate. Although the success of these ads has been
questioned, neither bill was enacted into law. Supporters of cam-
paign finance reform have criticized these ads as being mislead-
ing.46 However, the BCRA would not cover this activity.
4. "Election" Issue Advertisements
A third form of issue advocacy has been called "election" ad-
vocacy. These advertisements often include the names and photo-
graphs of specific candidates and are played almost exclusively
during an election year.47 A feature that distinguishes these from
educational issue ads is that election issue ads often discuss the
personal qualities of a candidate.48 These ads are often seen as
designed to influence the outcome of an election. However, since
most of these ads do not meet the express advocacy standards dic-
tated by Buckley, they were not regulated under campaign law un-
til the BCRA.49
POLITICAL MONEY: DEREGULATING AMERICAN POLITICS 236 (Annelise Anderson ed., 2000).
45 Magleby, supra note 43, at 42.
46 Id. at 42-43.
47 Id. at 41.
41 See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. McLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION
ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 32 (2001), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/buyingtime2000.htm.
49 Magleby, supra note 43, at 57.
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III. THE FEC's LITIGATION STRATEGY IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS5"
After Buckley, the FEC created regulations to broaden the ex-
press advocacy standard to cover election issue advocacy that ar-
guably was intended to influence elections. The FEC then insti-
tuted enforcement actions against individuals and interest groups.
The remaining cases interpreting the express advocacy doctrine
have appeared in the lower federal courts.
A. The First Application of Express Advocacy
In Federal Election Commission v. Central Long Island Tax
Reform Immediately Committee,5 1 a nonprofit association distrib-
uted a bulletin that reported the voting record of a specific con-
gressional representative and included his photograph. The bulle-
tin indicated which of his votes were consistent with the associa-
tion's views but did not refer to any election, political affiliation,
or opponent.52 The FEC argued that the bulletin met the express
advocacy standard because its purpose was not to inform the pub-
lic about an elected official's voting record, but instead to unseat
the candidate. Therefore, the association violated the filing and
disclaimer provisions for independent expenditures.53 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, rejected
this argument, stating that the words "expressly advocating" from
Buckley "mean[] exactly what they say." 54 Nothing in the bulletin
called for anyone's election or defeat. The court refused to inter-
pret Buckley as allowing an implied purpose of advocacy because
to do so would ignore the distinction ordered in that case.
55
B. A Strict Interpretation of Express Advocacy: Faucher v. Federal
Election Commission
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is-
sued the most restrictive interpretation of the express advocacy
standard in Faucher v. Federal Election Commission.5 6 The FECA
prohibits corporations from using general treasury funds to make
50 See generally, Trevor Potter, Issue Advocacy and Express Advocacy, in CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 227-39 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997). The structure of
this section was influenced by Potter's article.
-1 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980).
52 Id. at 51.
53 Id. at 48, 53.
4 Id. at 53.
I d.
5 928 F.2d 468 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. FEC v. Keefer, 502 U.S. 820 (1991).
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contributions or expenditures in federal elections. 57 The FEC had
issued regulations concerning voter guides, which are prepared by
many political nonprofit corporations and organizations. The
FEC's regulations stated that corporations could distribute "non-
partisan" voter guides. 58 "Nonpartisan" was defined as "not sug-
gest[ing] ...any position on the issues covered" and not express-
ing "editorial opinion concerning the issues presented. 59  The
Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. ("MRLC"), a nonprofit cor-
poration, sought an advisory opinion from the FEC regarding its
voter guide. The voter guides in question featured candidate and
party positions on pro-life issues and indicated when the commit-
tee agreed with the positions. The guide included a disclaimer
which read: "The publication of . . .the Candidate Survey does
not represent an endorsement of any candidate(s)." 60 The FEC
found that the MRLC voter guide's favoring of a pro-life position
did not meet the regulation's definition of "nonpartisan." The
MRLC challenged the FEC's authority to restrict issue advocacy
with its regulation.6'
The First Circuit first ruled that the FEC did not have statu-
tory authority under the statute to restrict issue advocacy through
regulations. The court recognized that normally an executive de-
partment's construction of a statute must be given great weight.
The First Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court, however, had
already spoken on the issue in Buckley. Consequently, the First
Circuit required a strict interpretation of the express advocacy test
because the Supreme Court specifically meant to protect issue ad-
vocacy in Buckley. The court rejected the FEC's invitation to
broaden the definition of express advocacy, noting that the Su-
preme Court is the "final authority" on statutory interpretation, and
its interpretation "becomes the law and must be given effect. 62
Secondly, in addressing the FEC's alternative argument, the
court held that the MRLC's voter guide did not constitute express
advocacy. According to the court, this question would require
"word games" and questions the Supreme Court hoped to avoid by
adopting the bright-line express advocacy test in Buckley.63 There-
51 Id. at 469 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)).
58 Id. at 470 (citing former FEC regulation I I C.F.R. § I 14.4(b)(5)).
59 Id. (citing former FEC regulation II C.F.R. § 114.4(b)(5)).
60 Id. at 469.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 471.
63 Id. at 472.
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fore, the court invalidated the FEC's regulation as unconstitution-
ally overbroad. 64
C. A Broader Interpretation of Express Advocacy: Federal Election
Commission v. Furgatch
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is-
sued a somewhat broader interpretation of the express advocacy
standard in Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch.65 In this
case, an individual published an advertisement in the New York
Times during the 1980 presidential election that criticized Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter and urged readers "DON'T LET HIM DO
IT." 66 The FEC argued that Furgatch's ad expressly advocated the
defeat of Jimmy Carter because it discussed the candidate rather
than political issues. Therefore, Furgatch violated the FECA by
failing to report this independent expenditure.67
The court deemed it a "close call" whether the advertisement
constituted express advocacy.68 Contrary to Faucher, the court
stated that Buckley did not establish a bright-line test. However,
the court wanted to further the purposes of the FECA, so that
speech that was "clearly intended" to affect an election would not
escape regulation. 69 As a result, the court stated that it had to fash-
ion a "more comprehensive approach" to interpreting express ad-
vocacy by rejecting "overly constrictive rules. 70
The court ruled that an advertisement did not have to use any
of the words listed in Buckley to be express advocacy because such
words can be easily avoided.7' Citing "fighting words," libel, and
subversive speech, the court accepted the FEC's argument that the
context in which the speech was produced should be considered in
determining express advocacy. The court concluded that the
speech "when read as a whole" with "limited reference to external
events" must be "susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation
but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate. 72
64 Id.
65 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987). Interestingly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not cite or discuss the Supreme Court's ruling in FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, even
though it was decided a month earlier. See FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d
1049, 1052-53 n.4 (4th Cir. 1997) (pointing out the Ninth Circuit's avoidance of the Supreme
Court's decision in Mass. Citizens for Life).
66 Furgatch, 807 F.2d at 858.
67 Id. at 859-60.
" Id. at 861.
69 Id. at 862.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 863.
72 Id. at 864.
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The standard has three main components. First, speech is express
if its message is "unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of
only one plausible meaning. 73 Second, advocacy requires a "clear
plea for action," not just a request for more information.74 Third,
the speech must make "clear what action is advocated. 75 Reason-
able minds cannot differ whether the speaker is urging them to
elect or defeat a candidate, or urging them to do something else.76
Applying this approach, the court held that the ad constituted
express advocacy. 7 The court focused on the "don't let him" part
of the ad, reasoning that these words were a simple and direct
command urging the audience to take some kind of action.78 Even
though the advertisement was "evasively written," its meaning was
clear because the only action open to the audience was to vote
against Jimmy Carter. This conclusion was supported by the fact
that the advertisement appeared less than a week before the elec-
79tion.
The Furgatch decision is considered notable among commen-
tators on campaign finance jurisprudence. Former FEC Chairman
Trevor Potter describes it as extremely "pro-regulatory." 80  One
notable development was the court's willingness to find express
advocacy in an implied meaning, since Furgatch did not explicitly
call for Carter's defeat. A second notable development was the
court's holding that it is permissible to look at context rather than
just the text of the ad to find express advocacy. 81 The Furgatch
decision can also arguably be seen as a not particularly broad read-
ing of precedent. As the Fourth Circuit interpreted it, Furgatch's
simple holding was that when a communication contains an ex-
plicit directive to take action, but it is not clear what action is ad-
vocated, the court can consider context.
82
D. Other Notable Express Advocacy Cases
With its victory in Furgatch, the FEC issued a new regulation





77 Id. at 866.
71 Id. at 865.
79 id.
80 Potter, supra note 50, at 230.
M' Id. at 232.
82 See FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1054 (4th Cir. 1997).
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case. 83 In Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Federal Election
Commission,84 the United States District Court for the District of
Maine invalidated this regulation. The court noted that this regula-
tion was reasonable and narrowly tailored. However, Buckley and
Massachusetts Citizens for Life show that the Supreme Court con-
sidered issue advocacy to be a "special concern" of the First
85Amendment. As a result, the Court purposely drew lines to avoid
restricting public discussion of issues and to ensure that speakers
know exactly what is permitted and prohibited. While the Su-
preme Court's bright-line rule could allow certain activities that
affect elections, the Court wanted to err on the side of permitting
speech.86 Therefore, the FEC's reinterpretation of this rule was
unconstitutionally overbroad. 87  The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's reasoning
without an opinion.88
The FEC found the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia to be unreceptive to its regulatory argu-
ments in Federal Election Commission v. Christian Action Net-
work, Inc.89  In this case, a Christian advocacy organization pro-
duced television commercials critical of the Clinton/Gore ticket
weeks before the 1992 presidential election. The commercial used
imagery, music, and narration alleging the candidates' support of
"radical homosexual causes. 90 At the end, the narrator urged the
audience to contact the Christian Action Network for "more infor-
mation on traditional family values." 91
83 Former FEC regulation I I C.F.R. § 100.22 defined express advocacy as:
[Any communication that... [wihen taken as a whole and with limited
reference to external events, such as the proximity to the election, could
only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the
election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s) because -
(1) the electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambi-
guous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and (2) [r]easonable minds
could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to elect or defeat one
or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of
action.
Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D. Me.), aff'd per curiam, 98 F.3d I
(Ist Cir. 1996).
84 914 F. Supp. 8.
85 Id. at 11-12.
86 Id. at 12.
17 Id. at 12-13.
88 See Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 98 F.3d 1 (Ist Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
19 894 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff'd per curiam, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996) (un-
published table decision).
90 Id. at 948.
91 Id. at 949.
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The FEC argued that a different analysis is needed with tele-
vision commercials because they use imagery and subtle nonverbal
92communication. It pointed out various aspects of the advertise-
ment: the "visual degrading" of Clinton's picture, the use of visual
text and voiceovers, "ominous" music, "unfavorable" coloring,
code words, editing, and the airing of the advertisement a few
weeks before the election. According to the FEC, the advertise-
ments sent a clear message to the audience to vote against Clin-
ton/Gore.
93
The district court recognized that the advertisements were
"openly hostile" to the candidates' proposals. 94 However, the ad-
vertisement did not use language that constituted express advo-
cacy. Although the advertisements were negative and inflamma-
tory, they did not use language directing the public how to vote.
Instead the ads urged the audience to contact the organization.95
To accept the FEC's definition of express advocacy, courts would
be forced to interpret not only the words in the advertisement but
its imagery. This type of analysis is completely at odds with the
Supreme Court's "express words" requirement. Further, the court
noted how the Supreme Court wanted to avoid misinterpretation of
the speaker's intent so that individuals would have notice of when
their speech will be regulated. Imagery is susceptible to even
more misinterpretation than words. Therefore, allowing the court
to consider imagery would result in a greater chilling effect.96 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarily
affirmed the reasoning of the district court.97
In a later action, the Christian Action Network sued for attor-
ney fees and costs. 98 In granting these, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the FEC's argument could not have been made in good faith,
given clear guidance from the Supreme Court that "express" or
"explicit" "words" are mandatory to find express advocacy. 99
While Furgatch offered the FEC some glimmer of hope in ex-
panding the express advocacy standard, most federal courts have
ruled in favor of Faucher and its line of reasoning. 10°
92 Id. at 955.
9. Id. at 957.
94 Id. at 953.
95 Id. at 953-54.
96 Id. at 957-58.
97 See FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
table decision).
18 See FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997).
99 Id. at 1064.
'00See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying a
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IV. THE RISE OF "ELECTION" IssuE ADVOCACY
A. Examples of Modern "Election" Issue Advocacy
1. 1996 Elections
Most commentators point to the 1996 elections as the year
when interest groups, unions, corporations, and political parties
began to spend massive amounts of money on "issue advocacy."
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, a scholar of political advertising, told the
Washington Post that she did not even tally party advertising in
1992 because there was not very much. In 1996, according to
Jamieson, it was the dominant form of advertising.'0 ' Also, the
content of the ads seemed to change. Political scientist Anthony
Corrado told the Washington Post that, in past election cycles,
election ads were more "generic" in that they focused more on
issues.10 2 One explanation for the widespread use of issue ads is
that, as typified by the 1993 health care debate, television advertis-
ing is successful. Another explanation is that the FEC's court de-
feats have signaled to more interest groups that they can safely
utilize issue ads.
103
Interest groups were very active during the 1996 elections. In
1996, the AFL-CIO announced it would spend $35 million on
commercials that would mention the names of Republican repre-
sentatives, attack their voting record on labor issues, and air im-
mediately before the general election. As a response, thirty-five
business groups announced they would spend $17 million on pro-
business advocacy defending the candidates. Other groups such as
the Sierra Club, the National Right to Life Committee, and the
narrow interpretation of express advocacy); Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d
379 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a strict limit on the definition of express advocacy is required,
unless Congress or the Supreme Court says otherwise); Citizens for Responsible Gov't State
Political PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000) (favoring a strict interpretation of
the express advocacy standard); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963 (8th
Cir. 1999) (allowing governmental scrutiny of campaign advertising); Right to Life of Dutchess
County, Inc., v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying "bright-line" requirements
of "express" or "explicit" words of advocacy to avoid prohibition on issue discussions); Vt.
Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Vt. 1998) (limiting Vermont's
definition of "political advertisement" to communications expressly or implicitly advocating the
success or defeat of a candidate).
101 Ruth Marcus, A Vote-for-Dole Ad by Another Name?: 'Issues Advocacy' Commercials
Put Focus on Parties' Candidates, WASH. POST, June I, 1996, at Al.
1021d.
1o3 Ruth Marcus, Outside Groups Pushing Election Laws into Irrelevance, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 1996, at A9.
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National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League also
announced their intentions to air commercials.' °4 Because these
groups would not use words of express advocacy, their ads would
qualify as issue ads and face no disclosure requirements. 105 The
Annenberg Public Policy Center estimated that the twenty-seven
organizations it studied for the 1995-96 election cycle eventually
spent $135-150 million on election advertising.106
The major political parties also took advantage of issue adver-
tising in 1996. Each party can spend $12 million supporting its
presidential nominee. However, by producing commercials that
avoided express advocacy terms, the party faced no limits. For
example, the Republican National Committee aired commercials
promoting its presidential candidate Bob Dole as part of a $20 mil-
lion ad campaign before the Republican convention. Instead of
telling the audience to vote for Dole, the ad instructed them to con-
tact their representatives. Republican National Committee com-
munications director Ed Gillespie contended that the ad talked
about issues that Dole supported. The Democrats, while arguing
that the Dole ad went over the legal line, responded by spending
more than $20 million on their own "issue" advertising. 107
2. 2000 Elections
The 2000 federal elections contained similar spending pat-
terns. The Brennan Center for Justice issued a comprehensive re-
port analyzing election advertisement spending in the 2000 elec-
tions. According to the Brennan Center, three groups made ex-
penditures for election advertising: candidates, party committees,
and interest groups. While interest groups spent $11 million to air
ads in 1998, they spent $98 million in 2000.108 Interest groups
spent about $42 million on "true" issue ads which discussed legis-
lative issues and were unrelated to campaigns. However, interest
groups spent $49 million on "election" issue ads that mentioned
candidates and aired in close proximity to elections. Apparently,
most advertisements avoided using words of express advocacy,
even candidate ads that are covered under election law.1°9 But, no
I'l WEST, supra note 7, at 53.
10 5 See id.
106GLENN MORAMARCO, REGULATING ELECTIONEERING: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
"EXPRESS ADVOCACY" & "ISSUE ADVOCACY" 9 (1998).
t)7 Marcus, supra note 101, at Al.
t01 HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 48, at 29.
109 Id. at 29, 31-32.
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one knows for sure how much interest groups have spent on issue
advertisements since they are not subject to any disclosure." °
B. The Effects of "Election" Issue Advocacy and the Basis for
Regulation
1. Negative Tone of Campaigns
A major criticism of modern "election" issue advertisements
is that they are less concerned with discussing campaign topics and
more concerned with attacking opponents."' The Annenberg Pub-
lic Policy Center found that 41 percent of party-funded election
ads were "pure attack" ads against federal candidates in 1996.'12
One famous example aired in Montana at the end of an election
season: "Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but
he took a swing at his wife. Yellowtail's explanation? He only
'slapped her,' but her nose was broken ... Call Bill Yellowtail and
tell him we don't approve of his wrongful behavior." ' 3
It has been argued that these ads create a negative tone of the
campaign, causing voters to become disgusted with the candidates,
which decreases voter turnout."l 4 The accuracy of these claims,
however, is less than clear. In fact, some researchers have con-
ducted studies that support the opposite conclusion.' '5 Critics of
the BCRA's regulation of issue advocacy argue that members of
Congress are neither genuinely concerned with changing the tone
of campaigns nor with addressing voter concerns. Instead, the
candidates actually want to restrict or punish their critics. 116
Election advertisements like the Yellowtail ad are certainly
infuriating and most likely contribute little to the election process.
First, while the ad may in fact be factually accurate, it is obviously
designed to personally attack the candidate rather than to discuss
the candidate's policies or public record. The latter may actually
""See H.R. REP. No. 107-131, pt. 1, at 36 (2001).
WEST, supra note 7, at 58-59.
"
2 Marianne Holt, The Surge in Party Money, in OUTSIDE MONEY: SOFT MONEY AND
ISSUE ADVOCACY IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, supra note 43, at 17, 25.
113 MARK GREEN, SELLING OUT 97 (2002); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing
the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1751 (1999).
114 Magleby, supra note 43, at 49.
"
5 See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, EVERYTHING YOU THINK YOU KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS . . . AND WHY YOU'RE WRONG (2000) (concluding that fair attack and its
rebuttal can be politically useful).
116 See H.R. REP. No. 107-131, pt. I, at 3 (2001) (arguing that although "[s]ome Members
of Congress may feel frustrated by the things being said about them ... the First Amendment
prevents Congress and its Members from using their powers to restrict, regulate or punish their
critics"); see also Will, supra note 8, at B7 (comparing the BCRA to the Sedition Act of 1798).
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be of interest to the voting public. Second, it is also unfair that an
anonymous group or person can produce such an insulting ad and
disappear. Congress, however, enters into dangerous constitu-
tional territory when it justifies speech regulation because it disap-
proves of the content. It is entirely settled that the material in the
Yellowtail ad is protected First Amendment speech. As the Su-
preme Court noted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 17 "debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
' 8
Furthermore, the classic weapon against bad speech is not suppres-
sion, but more speech.' 19
2. A Cesspool of Corruption
Another criticism of election issue advertisements is that they
are just another aspect of a corrupt election system. Commentators
point to the 1996 elections, in which the Clinton and Dole cam-
paigns spent millions of dollars for television ad campaigns, argu-
ing that it involved abuses far worse than Watergate. In fact, while
unregulated "soft money" contributions are normally associated
with large contributions from business interests, the political par-
ties funded these election issue advertisements with the same un-
regulated soft money. 20 Supporters of advertisement regulations
argue that restrictions on "election" issue ads are part of compre-
hensive campaign finance reform measures. These restrictions,
therefore, can be justified under the compelling governmental in-
terest of preventing actual corruption and the appearance of cor-
ruption upheld by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo. 2
2
The need to control the election spending of public officials
and their political parties is indeed a persuasive argument. Gov-
ernment officials have a duty to abide by ethical standards and
have important responsibilities to the public. Less persuasive,
however, is the need to prevent corruption or the appearance of
corruption when an interest group with voluntary membership uses
its dues and contributions for political advertisements. Critics of
17 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18 Id. at 270.
19 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("ITlhe
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.").
120 Fred Wertheimer, The Dirtiest Election Ever: The Spending Abuses of 1996 Should
Shame Us into Reform, WASH. PosT, Nov. 3, 1996, at CI.
121 See id.
122 424 U.S. 1,26-27 (1976) (per curiam).
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advertisement regulations like the National Rifle Association's
lead attorney, Charles Cooper, argue that such activity is democ-
racy, rather than the corruption of it.' 23 While interest groups have
benefited from the same "express advocacy" loophole, no one can
seriously argue that they should be regulated as intensely as public
officials and candidates for public office.
3. Lack of Compelled Disclosure
A final and perhaps more valid criticism leveled against inter-
est groups is that by carefully avoiding express advocacy lan-
guage, their ads face no disclosure requirements as to amount or
individuals making the expenditures. Lack of disclosure can have
serious consequences that affect the general voting public. First of
all, the ads may mislead voters into believing that the candidates
themselves are connected with ads produced by third parties. 
24
For example, some interest groups that support a specific candi-
date or state political parties hoping to aid a federal candidate vir-
tually copy the candidate's advertising to reinforce their mes-
sage.125 Although issue ads do not specifically say whether to vote
for or against a candidate, they share many characteristics with
candidate advertisements. They refer to specific candidates and
show their pictures, discuss campaign issues, are broadcast imme-
diately before elections, and are often aired in close proximity to
the candidates' own commercials.126 The commercials are some-
times so similar that researchers have found that the public will
blame the candidates when they object to interest groups' and po-
litical parties' negative advertising.1
27
While interest groups do not always produce misleading ad-
vertisements, they often deliberately disguise their identities in
their advertisements by creating obscurely named groups solely for
the purpose of issue advertisements. For example, in the 1998
elections, the AFL-CIO created the group "The Coalition to Make
Our Voices Heard," and the National Association of Manufacturers
created "The Coalition: Americans Working for Real Change.' 28
Voters cannot discover who is actually funding these "election"
issue advertisements. As a result, interest groups can avoid facing
123 Will, supra note 8, at B7.
124 WEST, supra note 7, at 56; Magleby, supra note 43, at 57.
125 Holt, supra note 112, at 25.
126 WEST, supra note 7, at 56.
127 Magleby, supra note 43, at 49.
128 1d. at 53-54.
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the reactions of voters after they have had an opportunity to evalu-
ate the information and weigh the groups' credibility.
29
Compelled disclosure requirements for interest groups may
infringe on their First Amendment right of association. 130  More-
over, the Supreme Court has recognized the right of individuals to
engage in anonymous political speech so that they will not face
suppression over their unpopular ideas.' 3 1  In Talley v. Califor-
nia, 32 the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance that prohib-
ited distribution under any circumstances of handbills that did not
contain the names and addresses of persons who prepared, distrib-
uted, or sponsored them. 33 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Com-
mission,134 the Court invalidated an Ohio statute that imposed a
fine for distribution of publications that did not contain the name
and residence of those issuing or creating them.135  The Court
stated in McIntyre that anonymous materials have played an im-
portant role in the progress of literature and politics. Furthermore,
an advocate may believe that anonymity will make his ideas more
persuasive or will limit prejudice of his message if he is personally
unpopular. 136 The Court stated that the interest in providing voters
with additional relevant information does not justify forcing a
speaker to make disclosures he would otherwise not provide.,
37
The Court has also recognized the electorate's right to infor-
mation. The Court upheld the disclosure requirements for federal
independent expenditures in Buckley because they served impor-
tant informational interests; the disclosure requirements not only
open the federal election system to public view, but they also in-
crease the amount of information about candidates' supporters and
help voters define the candidates' constituencies.' 38 Since "elec-
tion" advertisements differ from independent expenditures only in
terms of a few words, these same interests apply.
129 WEST, supra note 7, at 58; Magleby, supra note 43, at 53-54.
130 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam) ("[Clompelled disclosure ... can
seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
3' BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
221-22 (2001) (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)). Smith, a
strong critic of campaign finance regulations, is currently vice-chairman of the FEC. See
http://www.fec.gov/members/smith/smith.html (commissioner's home page, containing bio-
graphical information, opinions, commentary, etc.).
132362 U.S. 60 (1960).
131Id. at 60-61, 65.
1- 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
135Id. at 338, 357.
1361d. at 341-42.
137 Id. at 348.
138 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81-82; see also WEST, supra note 7, at 58 (commenting that with-
out information on campaign finance, voters are in a weak position to evaluate candidates).
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The factors that distinguish valid disclosure requirements
from invalid disclosure requirements are the breadth of the statute
and the circumstances of the speech. 139  For disclosure require-
ments to be constitutionally valid, they must be narrowly limited
to reach specific situations. In Buckley, the Court found the dis-
closure requirements valid for federal elections because they
reached only expenditures that were unambiguously campaign
related. 40 In Talley, while the ordinance was supposed to combat
fraud, false advertising, and libel, it was "in no manner so limited"
because it reached handbills distributed under any circum-
stances. 14 1 As a result, it covered an individual who distributed
handbills urging readers to boycott certain businessmen. 42 Simi-
larly, in McIntyre, the statute applied without regard to the type of
campaign activity involved, to the time period in which the speech
occurred, or to the speaker's interest in anonymity. 43 As a result,
it covered an individual who distributed a leaflet expressing her
opposition to a tax levy.' 44 As demonstrated below, the BCRA
carefully classifies a specific form of speech and limits the disclo-
sure requirements in terms of the type of campaign activity, the
time period in which the speech occurs, and the individuals and
groups who are covered.
V. CONGRESS AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT OF 2002
A. Congress' Basis for Issue Advocacy Regulation
In an article about their McCain-Feingold bill, much of which
was incorporated in the BCRA, Senators Russell Feingold and
John McCain outlined their intentions for the new amendments.
McCain and Feingold argued that statutory definitions like "ex-
press advocacy" have been exploited by recent federal campaigns
so that attack ads disguised as issue advocacy are dominating.
These ads are able to do so only because they purposefully avoid
using the "magic words" of Buckley. 45 Modern campaign tactics
blur the distinction between issue advocacy and independent ex-
39 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that the state may re-
quire the speaker to disclose its identity in "other, larger circumstances" with a "more limited
identification requirement").
140Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81.
'4' Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
142 Id. at 61.
143 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 351-52.
1'4 Id. at 337.
145 McCain & Feingold, supra note 44, at 234, 236-37.
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penditures. Since these ads are campaign appeals for all practical
purposes, they should be subject to election laws. 146 Therefore,
McCain and Feingold aim to regulate advocacy that attempts to
affect the outcome of elections, while leaving untouched what they
call "true" issue ads. 
147
B. Provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
After debating campaign finance reform bills over several
years, Congress finally passed campaign finance reform legislation
on March 27, 2002. The BCRA 148 consists of amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Title II regulates non-
candidate campaign expenditures. 149 It differentiates among three
distinct types of expenditures: independent expenditures, "true"
issue advertisements, and electioneering communications.
1. Independent Expenditures
The BCRA retains Buckley's express advocacy standard for
independent expenditures. They are defined as expenditures that
"expressly advocat[e] the election or defeat of a clearly defined
candidate," and that are not made "in concert or cooperation with
or at the request or suggestion of . . . [the] candidate, the candi-
date's authorized political committee, . . . or a political party."
50
2. "True" Issue Advocacy
The BCRA implicitly retains the idea of issue advocacy in
that it does not broaden the independent expenditure express advo-
cacy standard, and the new electioneering communication category
is too limited to cover all forms of issue advertisements.
3. Electioneering Communication
The BCRA creates a third class of expenditure activity called
electioneering communication. This provision attempts to regulate
a portion of issue advocacy that had previously been protected by
the Court's constitutional line drawing in Buckley. This provision
eliminates Buckley's dichotomy that treats ads using express advo-
46 WEST, supra note 7, at 59.
147 McCain & Feingold, supra note 44, at 236-37.
148 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
i49§ 201, 116 Stat. at 88-95. Title I, the most well known provision, prohibits political
parties from using unregulated soft money. See § 101, 116 Stat. at 82-86.1.0§ 211I, 116 Stat. at 92-93.
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cacy as independent expenditures, while treating everything else as
issue advocacy.
Under the first definition, Congress classifies "electioneering
communication" as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communica-
tion which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal of-
fice" that is "made within 60 days before a general, special, or
runoff election" or "30 days before a primary or preference elec-
tion, or a convention or caucus."' 51 If the communication refers to
a candidate for office other than for President or Vice President, it
must also be "targeted to the relevant electorate." To be "targeted
to the relevant electorate," the communication must be able to be
received by 50,000 or more people in a Representative candidate's
district or in a Senate candidate's state.52
The BCRA includes an alternative definition of election-
eering communication that will apply if the Supreme Court finds
the first definition unconstitutional. This definition covers:
[A]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which
promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or
opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the
communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a
candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible mean-
ing other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate.
53
The BCRA excludes from both definitions any communica-
tion from a "news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station" unless the can-
didate, a political party, or a political committee owns or controls
the facilities. 54 Congress also excludes from both definitions in-
dependent expenditures and any FEC regulations issued under the
BCRA.
155
a. Disclosure Requirements for Electioneering Communications
The BCRA mandates that persons who spend over $10,000 in
a calendar year to produce and air electioneering communications
must file a disclosure form with the FEC within twenty-four hours
of the first date such activity aggregates in excess of $10,000. The
form must contain the person's identifying information, place of
1-5 § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 89-90.
152 Id. at 90.
153 Id.
'5 Id. at 89-90.
155 Id.
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business, the amount of money spent, and the elections and candi-
dates to which the expenditures pertain. 156
b. Corporate and Labor Electioneering Communications
The BCRA also prohibits corporate and labor disbursements
for electioneering communications from treasury funds. 157 Corpo-
rations and unions can still produce or air electioneering commu-
nications using funds that individuals voluntarily contribute to the
corporationor to the union's political action committee. These
expenditures, however, would now be subject to disclosure re-
quirements. The BCRA exempts from these provisions tax-exempt
corporations 58 and political organizations159 that make electioneer-
ing communications with funds donated solely by individuals who
are citizens or permanent resident aliens. 60 The FEC issued a con-
troversial regulation that exempts charitable, religious, and educa-
tional groups. 161
VI. THE BCRA AND THE CONSTITUTION: IS THE "EXPRESS
ADVOCACY" STANDARD CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED?
The first question to address regarding the BCRA and the
Constitution is whether the express advocacy standard that the
Court created in Buckley is constitutionally required. If so, Con-
gress can never constitutionally regulate forms of issue advocacy
as electioneering communication. As a result, a court must find
both definitions of "electioneering communication" under the
BCRA unconstitutionally overbroad.
A. Arguments in Support
Many commentators see Buckley as applying complete consti-
tutional protection under the First Amendment for advertisements
that do not contain express advocacy. They argue that the Su-
preme Court knew that creating the express advocacy standard
would provide an opportunity for issue advertisements to be used
to influence the outcome of elections. The Court, however, cre-
'6 Id. at 88, 90.
1-7 § 203(b), 116 Stat. at 91.
1ss The corporations must meet the tax-exempt requirements under I.R.C. § 501(c)(1)-(3)
(2000).
'-9 As defined in 1.R.C. § 527(e)(I) (2000).
I1)§ 203(b), 116 Stat. at 91.
61 See II C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(6) (2003), available at http:/lwww.fec.gov/lawlcfr/
I lcfr.pdf. The groups must meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). See also
Thomas B. Edsall, Religious, Charitable Groups Get Exemption on Campaign Finance, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at AS.
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ated the distinction between issue and express advocacy for one
very important reason: the First Amendment protects discussion of
public issues, and candidates and campaigns generate public is-
sues. The fact that issue ads may influence elections cannot justify
the chilling of political speech that would occur otherwise. 62 The
"loophole" that regulators wish to close is called the First
Amendment. 163
Only Judge Henderson of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia adhered to this view in her opinion in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.164 As a result, Judge
Henderson analyzed the legislation under Buckley's express advo-
cacy standard. She immediately found both definitions of elec-
tioneering communication unconstitutionally overbroad because by
proposing to regulate forms of issue advocacy, the legislation
could not meet Buckley's express advocacy standard.
65
B. The Express Advocacy Standard Is Not Constitutionally Required
In McConnell, two judges held that the express advocacy
standard is not constitutionally required under Buckley.' 66  The
Supreme Court should affirm this holding for two reasons. First,
in Buckley, the Court created the express advocacy standard as a
form of statutory construction to cure unconstitutional vagueness.
Congress must be allowed to address modern problems with the
BCRA. Second, federal court rulings supporting the notion that
express advocacy is constitutionally required were merely con-
strained by the Court's interpretation of the FECA.
1. The Court Was Construing a Flawed Statute
The Court in Buckley invalidated a portion of the FECA that
imposed limitations on independent expenditures. The Court's
holding, however, must be viewed in light of the context of the
legislation. In Buckley, the Supreme Court was not faced with a
clear, narrowly tailored statute enacted by Congress to regulate the
millions of dollars spent on certain types of election advertise-
ments. Instead, Congress amended the FECA in 1974 out of spe-
162 Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft
Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 186-87 (1998).
163See H.R. REP. No. 107-131, pt. I, at 3 (2001).
IM 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 364 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam) (Henderson, J.) ("In the con-
spicuous absence of contrary precedent, I would be loathe to hold that the Congress was free to
reject the express advocacy test in enacting Title I1.").
"' Id. at 373 (Henderson, J.); see also id. at 594 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
' 251 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
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cific concerns from the Watergate scandal involving large, unre-
ported individual and corporate donations that funded President
Nixon's 1972 reelection. In fact, campaign spending on election
advertisements in the 1970s did not resemble our modern cam-
paign finance system. As noted above, most commentators point
to the 1996 elections as the point when the election advertising
changed the system. Although the 1972 elections were more ex-
pensive than previous elections, spending for radio and television
campaign advertising had actually dropped because candidates saw
other modes of communication as more effective. 67 While the
1974 Amendments included regulation of advertisement expendi-
tures, Congress was more concerned with limiting campaign ex-
penditures to make the reform comprehensive. 168
Since Congress was not specifically addressing the problems
associated with election advertising, it made some mistakes in the
clarity of the statutory language defining independent expendi-
tures. However, as Judge Kollar-Kotelly stated for the court in
McConnell, the Court in Buckley "invoked the express advocacy
test only as a means of statutory construction" to cure the provi-
sion's unconstitutional vagueness. 169 First, the Court added preci-
sion to the phrase "relative to" by construing it to mean "advocat-
ing the election or defeat of' a candidate.170 Second, the Court
held that such advocacy must be "express" so that speakers will
know if their speech is covered. 171
The Court never stated that the express advocacy standard
was constitutionally required if Congress chose to regulate election
advertisements. Instead, the Court was protecting issue discussion
from regulation in the best way available at the time. In doing so,
the Court unwittingly created a dichotomy between express advo-
cacy and all other forms of election communication. However,
because the current problem did not exist in 1976, the Court could
not address nor conceptually realize the subcategories that exist in
other forms election advertising. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly stated
in McConnell, the Supreme Court in Buckley was not "announcing
an unalterable principle of constitutional law that would prohibit
future congressional action directed toward express and issue ad-
167 CONG. QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 22, at 41,43-44.
I"8See S. REP. No. 93-689 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5587-90 (outlin-
ing the purposes for the amendments).
169251 F. Supp. 2d at 597 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
170 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
171 Id. at 44.
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vocacy. ' ' 72 Congress must be given the opportunity to deal with
specific, modern problems without irrelevant statutory construc-
tions.
2. Constrained Federal Courts
Many argue that express advocacy is constitutionally required
and cite for support the majority of federal court decisions uphold-
ing the express advocacy standard. These post-Buckley cases,
however, do not establish that Congress can never regulate forms
of issue advocacy. Instead, lower courts were constrained by the
Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of independent expendi-
tures, no matter how impractical the interpretation became. The
lower courts also recognized that the FEC did not have the author-
ity to redefine the express advocacy test - only Congress or the
Court can constitutionally do so.1
73
In Maine Right to Life Committee v. Federal Election Com-
mission,174 a federal district court invalidated the FEC's regulation
defining express advocacy because it regulated issue advocacy, the
court noted that the result in the case was not "satisfying" because
it did not recognize the policy "to keep corporate money from in-
fluencing elections in this way."'175 However, the FEC's regulation
did not "recognize the First Amendment interest as the Supreme
Court has defined it.'' 176 In Faucher v. Federal Election Commis-
sion,177 in which the First Circuit invalidated the FEC's regulation
of voter guides, the court specifically stated that the Supreme
Court has the final say on statutory interpretation. 78 The FEC is
not supposed to second-guess the Supreme Court but is supposed
to issue regulations consistent with legislation and the Court's in-
terpretation of legislation. 1
79
VII. THE BCRA AND THE CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS
BEYOND "EXPRESS ADVOCACY"
Since the express advocacy standard is not constitutionally
required, the Supreme Court does not need to adhere to the statu-
tory interpretation in Buckley. Instead, the Court should determine
172 51 F. Supp. 2d at 597-98. (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
173 Id. at 600 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
'74 914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me.), affd, 98 F.3d I (I st Cir. 1996).
17 5 Id. at 12.
1
7 6 Id.
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if the BCRA's provisions are consistent with the fundamental First
Amendment principles that concerned the Buckley Court. These
principles include: (1) requiring a bright-line rule to avoid vague-
ness, to avoid a chilling effect, and to provide fair notice to speak-
ers; and (2) requiring narrow tailoring to restrict overbroad regula-
tion of protected political speech. In McConnell v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission, two judges held that the primary definition of
electioneering was unconstitutional. Judge Henderson found the
primary definition vague and overbroad.181 Judge Leon found the
definition only overbroad, but for different reasons than Judge
Henderson. 82 Two judges held that the alternate definition was
not unconstitutionally vague, but only after severing its final
clause. 83 However, the Supreme Court should rule that the pri-
mary definition of electioneering communication upholds First
Amendment standards while the alternative definition does not.
A. The Primary Definition of Electioneering Communication
Is Not Vague
As outlined above, the first portion of the preferred definition
of electioneering communication involves "any broadcast, cable,
or satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified can-
didate for Federal office" that is "made within 60 days before a
general, special, or runoff election" or "30 days before a primary,
.. convention, or caucus."' 4 When the communication refers to
candidates running for offices other than President or Vice Presi-
dent, it must also be "targeted to the relevant electorate," meaning
it is receivable by 50,000 or more people in a Representative can-
didate's district or in a Senate candidate's state.1
85
This definition is a bright-line rule that avoids vagueness con-
cerns. In fact, the lines could not be brighter. First, the speaker
has clear notice if the components of his ad are covered. Whether
the ad is a broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, whether
the ad refers to a clearly identified candidate, and whether the ad is
targeted to the relevant electorate are completely objective deter-
minations. The speaker will not engage in self-censorship because
no interpretation of the statute is needed on his part. Second, the
'10 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam).
181 Id. at 367 (Henderson, J.).
182 Id. at 792 (Leon, J.).
183 Id.





speaker has notice of when his speech is covered by the Act. The
statute features a "delimited time period" approach in which an
advertisement that occurs within a specific period of time is regu-
lated the same as an election ad. 186 It avoids any interpretation of
reasonableness or intent. A speaker can know if his ad is covered
by looking at a calendar. Third, the FEC, in its enforcement ca-
pacity, can objectively determine whether the BCRA covered cer-
tain speech.
187
Judge Henderson in McConnell, however, argued that the
phrase "refers to" was indeed vague because it was dangerously
close to the phrase "relative to," which the Supreme Court rejected
in Buckley. 188  However, this argument is without substantial
weight. First, as Judge Kollar-Kotelly countered, the word "refer"
is much more precise than the phrase "relative to." The dictionary
definition of "refer" includes "by clear and specific mention."'
189
Second, and more importantly, none of the plaintiffs in McConnell
even argued to the court that the primary definition was unconsti-
tutionally vague.' 90
B. The Primary Definition Is Not Substantially Overbroad
The major concern for the Court will be whether the statute is
overbroad. The Supreme Court has ruled that a statute must be
"substantially overbroad" to be facially invalidated.' 9' Therefore,
the determination of whether "electioneering communication" is
substantially overbroad depends on how many "true" issue adver-
tisements the BCRA will actually cover. The primary definition is
not substantially overbroad for two reasons. First, a delimited time
period approach, while novel, is not necessarily unconstitutional.
Second, the definition of "electioneering communication" is nar-
rowly tailored to cover only "election" advertisements.
1. A Delimited Time Period Approach
Unlike the alternate definition, the primary definition is based
on the time and location of an ad rather than the ad's effect on the
'
86 MORAMARCO, supra note 106, at 14 (containing the origin of the phrase "delimited
time period" for the purposes of this Note).
87 Id. at 14-15.
188 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (Henderson, J.).
1891d. at 604 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(lOth ed. 1997)).
I9 Id.
91 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[Tjhe overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legiti-
mate sweep.").
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campaign. 192 In McConnell, this aspect of the primary definition
particularly troubled Judge Leon. 193 Some critics contend that a
"delimited time period" approach is clearly overbroad, arguing that
advertisements occurring right before an election deserve the most
protection because that is when the public interest in political
speech is the highest. 94 A delimited time period approach, while
novel, is not necessarily unconstitutional.
In Mills v. Alabama,'95 the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute that criminalized "any electioneering" supporting or oppos-
ing "any proposition" on election day. The state argued that the
statute protected the public from last minute allegations on elec-
tion day because a candidate could not answer such allegations
until after the election. The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
The statute allowed people to make allegations up to the last min-
ute before election day. Yet, the statute made it a crime to answer
those allegations on election day, the only day available. There-
fore, the statute was ineffective in protecting the public from last
minute allegations. 196
In Arizona Right to Life Political Action Committee v.
Bayless, 197 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
invalidated another time period regulation. This case involved a
statute that required political action committees making independ-
ent expenditures to send a copy of the communication to the
named candidate twenty-four hours before mailing or submitting it
for broadcast or publication. 98 As in Mills, the purpose of the
statute was to limit negative advertising and to give candidates an
opportunity to respond. The Ninth Circuit invalidated the statute
because it imposed a twenty-four hour waiting period on political
speech, prohibited political speech in situations where the notice
requirement was not possible, and discriminated against speech
from political action committees.199
These rulings do not stand for the proposition that all delim-
ited time period regulations are unconstitutional. One can distin-
guish the regulations at issue in the BCRA in three ways. First,
the statute in Mills was so broad that an editor of a daily newspa-
192 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 796 (Leon, J.).
1931d. at 795 (Leon, J.) ("[Tihe crux of the problem with primary definition is that ... it
does not depend on the effect of the communication's message on a candidate's election.").
194 See Smith, supra note 162, at 192.
195 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
96Id. at 219-20.
197 320 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003).




per was arrested after writing an editorial urging people to vote for
a certain issue. 200 By contrast, the BCRA does not apply to print
material, specifically exempts any communication in an editorial,
and applies only to advertisements that mention federal candi-
dates. 01
Second, unlike the statutes in Mills and Arizona Right to Life,
the BCRA does not implement an outright ban or a prior restraint
on speech. This is perhaps the most widely misconstrued aspect of
the BCRA.2°2 Interest groups and individuals can broadcast their
advertisements at any time. However, if the ad airs 60 days before
a general election or 30 days for a primary election, the ad is sub-
ject to the same disclosure requirements and corporate/labor re-
strictions as independent expenditures. While critics can argue
that these restrictions are too burdensome under the First Amend-
ment, they cannot argue that the restrictions create a total ban.
Third, one can rationalize the basis for regulation differently
under the BCRA. The statutes in Mills and Arizona Right to Life
were clearly intended to combat negative advertising and equalize
the playing field in election advertising. Restrictions based on the
dislike of the speech's content will almost never be constitutional.
Under the First Amendment, speakers, not the government, decide
what they want to say and how they want to say it. 203 While many
members of Congress are critical of negative advertising, the
BCRA can be seen as closing a loophole to subject election-related
material to the same constitutional regulations as independent ex-
penditures.
2. The Primary Definition Is Narrowly Tailored
a. Types of Communication
The primary definition of "electioneering communication"
under the BCRA only covers election advertisements disseminated
from "broadcast, cable, or satellite. '2 °4 Therefore, the definition
excludes print and Internet election communication. The fact that
211 Mills, 384 U.S. at 215-16.
211 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81,
89 (2002).
202 See Statement, supra note 10 (questioning "the constitutionality of the broad ban on is-
sue advertising"); Russ Lewis, Foreign to the First Amendment, WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at
AI5 (referring to "issue advertising ban" in the BCRA); Will, supra note 8, at B7 (claiming the
BCRA creates "30- or 60- day blackout periods" for advertisements).
203 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781,790-91 (1988).
214 § 201 (a), 116 Stat. at 89.
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Congress specifically regulated only the forms of media it found
205problematic indicates narrow tailoring.
b. Timing of Communication
The primary definition only regulates advertisements that re-
fer to a federal candidate 60 days before a general, special, or run-
off election or 30 days before a primary.20 6 Therefore, if an inter-
est group advertises 61 days before a general election or 31 days
before a primary, it faces no regulation. The rationale behind this
provision is that most "election" advertisements will air immedi-
ately before an election. By defining the ad according to its air-
time, the regulation will catch these "election" advertisements. °7
Critics of the BCRA argue that Congress often debates impor-
tant pieces of legislation 30 days before a primary or 60 days be-
fore a general election. The broad sweep of the legislation would
capture ads that mention the names of federal candidates but are
actually "legislative" advertisements.2 8 Judge Leon in McConnell
subscribed to this argument. 2°9 He was persuaded by the McCon-
nell plaintiffs' experts who argued that periods immediately pre-
ceding elections are "the most effective times" to run advertise-
ments discussing legislation because that is when the public is pay-
ing attention to politics. 2  As support, he cited the period preced-
ing the 2002 congressional elections in which Congress debated
such important issues as a resolution authorizing the use of force
in Iraq and the creation of a Department of Homeland Security.21 '
Judge Leon's conclusion, however, is less than compelling.
As Judge Leon himself admitted, the events of last year were
probably not "typical. 21 2  Political advertisements traditionally
follow a more predictable course. According to the Brennan Cen-
ter for Justice, "genuine" issue advertisements during the 2000
election occurred throughout the year along with debates in Con-
gress. Congress holds most key votes before Labor Day. After
2o- McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569 (per curiam) (Koller-Kotelly, J.).
2(6§ 201(a), 116 Stat. at 89.
217 See MORAMARCO, supra note 106, at 15 (arguing that this approach is based on the
"common sense" recognition that ads mentioning candidates close to an election aim to influ-
ence the election).
211 See Smith, supra note 162, at 192-93.
219 251 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (Leon, J.) ("ITIhe primary definition, which regulates communi-
cations ... based upon when and where they are broadcast, rather than their effect on federal
elections, sweeps so broadly that it captures too much First Amendment protected speech ...
214) Id. at 794 (Leon, J.).
211Id.
212 Id. at 793 n.98 (Leon, J.).
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Labor Day, Congress does not hold many votes, so interest groups
do not advertise. If Congress does hold a vote during this period,
many interest groups are driven off the air because of the increased
flow of election advertising and higher rates. As a result, interest
groups ran about 80% of "genuine" issue ads in the 2000 elections
long before 60 days prior to the general election.1 3
c. Target of Communication
The primary definition covers only communications referring
to candidates running for the Senate or the House and must be
"targeted to the relevant electorate." 214 For example, a group pro-
ducing an advertisement that refers to a specific candidate right
before an election can avoid regulation by airing the ad nationally,
rather than targeting it to a candidate's district or state.
3. Empirical Studies
In McConnell, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving the
BCRA was substantially overbroad.2 5 Therefore, empirical stud-
ies of election advertising were extremely important in the case.
The Brennan Center for Justice studied advertisements in the 2000
elections. According to the Brennan Center, within 60 days of an
election, interest group ads that featured a federal candidate aired
50,950 times. Only 331 of these ads were about pending legisla-
216tion in Congress. Therefore, the BCRA would have covered
only 0.65% of protected speech. While no one rejoices when pro-
tected First Amendment speech is regulated, such a small fraction
shows that the primary definition of "electioneering communica-
tion" is not substantially overbroad.
The judges in McConnell held widely different views on how
much weight to ascribe to the empirical evidence. Judge Hender-
son completely dismissed the Brennan Center's studies as well as
any attempt to differentiate between election advertisements. She
concluded that "the record as a whole" suggested that the primary
definition was substantially overbroad.21 7 Judge Leon was not
quite as dismissive of the studies. He admitted that they deserved
some evidentiary weight. Yet, he noted that it was impossible to
specifically calculate the amount of protected speech the BCRA
213 HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 48, at 58.
214 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81,
89 (2002).
215 251 F. Supp. 2d at 796 (Leon, J.).
216 HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 48, at 58, 72.217McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (Henderson, J.).
2003]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
would regulate. He also discussed how the two sides had argued
about the exact method of calculation. However, he concluded
that the plaintiffs had met their burden because the primary defini-
tion presented a realistic danger of infringement on protected
speech.218
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, however, presented the most persuasive
insight regarding the empirical studies. The plaintiffs presented
twenty-one advertisements from the 1998 to 2000 elections that
they claimed were examples of issue advocacy that the BCRA
would regulate. However, Judge Kollar-Kotelly determined that
eight were not run within the time period, one was not targeted to
the electorate, and four were examples of electioneering. Even
assuming the remaining eight advertisements were "true" issue
advertisements, eight ads covering over two election cycles, in-
cluding primaries and general elections, did not constitute substan-
tial overbreadth. 1 9
Furthermore, an event involving the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), a plaintiff in McConnell, is particularly informa-
tive. The ACLU ran issue advertisements in March of 2002. The
ads were directed at Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, urging
him to bring the Employment Non-Discrimination Act to a full
vote. It was broadcast in Speaker Hastert's district within 30 days
of a primary election. The ACLU argued that since their "issue"
advertisement would have been covered by the BCRA, the statute
was substantially overbroad. However, an internal email from the
ACLU indicates the ad was carefully designed and aired to qualify
as "electioneering communication" under the BCRA so that the
ACLU could obtain standing to challenge the law. Two defense
experts testified that if plaintiffs were correct that the BCRA
sweeps so broadly as to catch "true" issue ads, then it should have
220been easy to find real-life examples of such occurrences.
C. The Alternative Definition of Electioneering Communication Is
Unconstitutionally Vague
The alternative definition of electioneering communication
covers:
[A]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which
promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or
opposes a candidate for office (regardless of whether the
218 Id. at 797-99 (Leon, J.).
219 Id. at 574-75 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).2211 Id. at 576-77 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
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communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a
candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible mean-
ing other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate.22'
This definition resembles the interpretation of express advocacy
promulgated by the Ninth Circuit in Federal Election Commission
v. Furgatch222 and the subsequent FEC regulations invalidated in
Maine Right to Life Committee v. Federal Election Commission.223
The provision is somewhat different because the ad must promote,
support, attack, or oppose the candidate. It also omits any mention
of the ad's context or the reasonableness of the audience's inter-
pretation. It retains, however, the "suggestive of no other plausi-
ble meaning" standard. Despite these differences, the House Ad-
ministration Committee Report indicates the definition was based
on Furgatch.224
1. Promote, Support, Attack, or Oppose: Who Decides?
By the plain language of the statute, it is not clear how one
determines whether an ad promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a
candidate. The statute does not include any reasonableness lan-
guage. However, if one is supposed to infer such language, then
the provision can be classified as a "reasonable person" ap-
proach.225 In McConnell, Judge Leon inferred that a reasonable-
ness standard applied in his holding for the court that the alternate
221 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81,
89 (2002).
222 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987). Under this approach "[speech] must, when read as a
whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable
interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id. at 864.
Speech is express advocacy if "its message is unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of
only one plausible meaning," "it presents a clear plea for action," and it is clear "what action is
advocated." Id.
223914 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D. Me. 1996), affdpercuriam, 98 F.3d I (Ist Cir. 1996). Former
FEC regulation I I C.F.R. § 100.22 defined express advocacy as:
[Ainy communication that... [wlhen taken as a whole and with limited
reference to external events, such as the proximity to the election, could
only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the
election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s) because -
(I) the electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambi-
guous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and (2) [r]easonable minds
could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to elect or defeat one
or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of
action.
Me. Right to Life Comm., 914 F. Supp. at 10.
224 H.R. REP. No. 107-131, pt. 1, at7 (2001).
225 See MORAMARCO, supra note 106, at 13 (Moramarco's article is the origin of the "rea-
sonable person" approach for the purposes of this Note).
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226definition was not unconstitutionally vague. As Judge Leon
pointed out, a "reasonable person" approach is not unheard of in
First Amendment standards. 22 7 The Court has ruled in the "fight-
ing words ' 228 and obscenity 229 contexts that such an approach is
not unconstitutionally vague.
Judge Leon, however, ignores the fact that the "reasonable
person" approach automatically raises vagueness concerns. The
determination of whether the speech should be regulated is subjec-
tive. 230 The Supreme Court, therefore, should rule that the reason-
able person approach is unconstitutionally vague in this context.
First, the Court has struggled with applying a reasonableness stan-
dard in obscenity cases, illustrating how undesirable they are. It is
doubtful that the Court would wish to revisit a similar standard in
election speech. Second, the Court has traditionally seen fighting
words and obscenity as unprotected, while classic political speech
like election-related speech receives the most protection. Third, a
reasonableness standard gives little notice to speakers or to the
FEC. Most importantly, a reasonableness standard violates the
principles outlined by the Court in Buckley, because the Court spe-
cifically wanted to avoid putting the speaker "wholly at the mercy"
of the audience's understanding of the speech.23'
Alternately, whether an ad promotes, supports, attacks or op-
poses may depend on what message the speaker intended his mes-
sage to convey. Assuming this to be true, the approach would be
classified as an "intent-based" approach.232 This definition creates
the same vagueness problems as a reasonableness standard because
of its subjective nature. Plus, it is the type of standard the Buckley
Court hoped to avoid. Moreover, one wonders how the FEC is to
determine whether a group intended to influence an election. If
this means the FEC must investigate an organization's records,
memoranda, and donor lists, then this approach creates a great
226McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (Leon, J.). Judge Kollar-Kotelly joined Judge
Leon's conclusion, making this the holding of the court.
227 Id.
22 8See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (defining "fighting words" as "those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of
common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction").
229 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that a basic guideline for the
trier of fact must be "whether the average person applying contemporary community standards"
would find material obscene).
23o McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (Leon, J.).
231 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 43 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 535 (1945)).
232 See MORAMARCO, supra note 106, at 17 (Moramarco's article is the origin of the
phrase "intent-based" for the purposes of this Note.).
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chilling effect on speech.233 Because of its vagueness and chilling
effect, the Supreme Court should rule that this provision violates
the First Amendment principles outlined in Buckley.
2. "Plausible Meaning": Who Decides?
It is also not clear how one determines the "plausible mean-
ing" of the ad. While the statute does not contain the reasonable-
ness language of Furgatch or Maine Right to Life, Congress, by
basing the provision on Furgatch, may have intended to carry over
its interpretive elements. Alternately, the plausible meaning may
depend on the speaker's intentions. No matter which approach
applies, both contain the same vagueness problems and chilling
effect as illustrated above. Judge Leon found this portion uncon-
stitutionally vague because the speaker would have difficulty de-
termining whether his ad met the requirement. Therefore, Judge
Leon severed this clause to make the remaining aspects of the
definition constitutional.234 However, the Supreme Court should
find the entire definition unconstitutionally vague, with or without
the final clause.
CONCLUSION
Public discussion of political issues is a fundamentally impor-
tant free speech right. During an election, however, the electorate
also has substantial rights. In a democracy, elections occur so that
the people can choose their system of government. To make an
informed choice, the people must have access to all information.
This includes information regarding who funds federal campaign
advertisements and how much they spend. In our modern election
system, however, groups, political parties, and individuals spend
millions to influence elections through advertising. Sponsors of
these ads intentionally make sure they remain out of reach of regu-
lation that would provide crucial information to the public.
The Supreme Court must draw constitutional lines that pertain
to the country's modern campaign finance system. The Supreme
Court does not need to analyze the BCRA under the "express ad-
vocacy" standard because it is not constitutionally required. In-
stead, the Court must analyze it consistently with Buckley's broad
First Amendment principles. In doing so, the Court should rule
that the primary definition of "electioneering communication" ful-
fills the principles outlined in Buckley because it is a bright-line
2
.
31 Smith, supra note 162, at 191.214 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 802 (Leon, J.).
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rule that is narrowly tailored to reach only a certain type of elec-
tion advertisements. The Court should further rule that the alterna-
tive definition of "electioneering communication" is unconstitu-
tionally vague.
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